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Abstract Multidisciplinary models aggregating ‘lower-level’ biological and ‘higher-
level’ psychological and social determinants of a phenomenon raise a puzzle.
How is the interaction between the physical, the psychological and the social
conceptualized and explained? Using biopsychosocial models of pain as an illus-
tration, I argue that these models are in fact level-neutral compilations of empirical
findings about correlated and causally relevant factors, and as such they nei-
ther assume, nor entail a conceptual or ontological stratification into levels of
description, explanation or reality. If inter-level causation is deemed problem-
atic or if debates about the superiority of a particular level of description or
explanation arise, these issues are fueled by considerations other than empirical find-
ings.
Keywords Philosophy of biology · Experimental research · Pain · Causality
1 Multidisciplinary models
The diagnosis and pathology of many psychiatric conditions encompasses a mixture
of physiological and psychological symptoms, risk factors and causal determinants
(Kendall 2001; Kendler and Campbell 2009; Murphy 2006; Schaffner 1993). Epi-
demiological studies reveal that many common diseases are multifactorial and can
be influenced by factors such as genes, diet, life style and socioeconomic sta-
tus (Broadbent 2013, Ch. 10; Howick 2011). Biopsychosocial models of somatic
disease emphasize multiple levels of medical intervention (Engel 1977, 1980).
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Finally, in basic science, there are many examples of models of psychological
and social phenomena which include biological determinants and sometimes cases
where psychological and social factors make an appearance in biological explana-
tions.
To give a particularly striking example, one of the most revolutionary features
of the gate control model of pain lies in the attempt to integrate neurophysiological
and psychological determinants of pain experience. The model posits that a neural
circuit mechanism in the dorsal horn of the spinal cord modulates signals from noci-
ceptors by integrating inputs from thermo-mechanical receptors and from brain areas
associated with cognitive and emotional appraisals, thus altering the quality and inten-
sity of pain experience (Melzack and Wall 1965). The proposal opened the door to
multidisciplinary approaches yielding a variety of biopsychosocial models of pain
according to which pain experience “is determined by the interaction among bio-
logical, psychological (which include cognition, affect, behavior), and social factors
(which include the social and cultural contexts that influence a person’s perception
of and response to physical signs and symptoms)” (Asmundson and Wright 2004,
42).
Yet, despite their popularity, multidisciplinary models raise a puzzle. Each disci-
pline provides its own unique perspective on a given phenomenon which is insulated
from other disciplinary perspectives. Some disciplinary boundaries are historical
contingencies or by-products of social and political agendas. In such cases, multidis-
ciplinary research is made possible by a restructuring of scientific institutions. Other
boundaries, however, are taken to reflect more profound epistemic and metaphysical
differences, such as differences in experimental methods, distinct theoretical frame-
works and even divergent assumptions about the nature of reality. These differences,
which cannot be removed by a mere reshuffling of institutional affiliations and fund-
ing incentives, motivate much stronger ‘level’ distinctions which seem to undermine
multidisciplinary research.
In this paper, I argue that multidisciplinary models reveal an important, but under-
estimated feature of empirical research, namely its neutrality in respect to levels of
description, explanation and reality. The upshot of this claim is that if debates about
the epistemic superiority of a particular level of description or explanation arise, or
if ontological distinctions are drawn between intra- and inter-level causation, somatic
and psychogenic etiology or pathogenesis, then these issues are due to considerations
other than empirical research.
In Sect. 2, I discuss the rationales for distinguishing levels of description, expla-
nation and reality, and explain how a level-laden conception of science clashes with
multidisciplinary research. I argue that the clash is resolved either by assuming the
eventual reduction of psychological and social perspectives to biological explanations;
or, more interestingly, by engaging in a largely experimental research program aiming
to generate and systematize findings about empirically established correlations and
causal determinants of a particular phenomenon.
In Sect. 3, I characterize biopsychosocial models of pain in particular and multidis-
ciplinary models in general as attempts to summarize what is known about correlates
and causal-mechanistic determinants of a given phenomenon. Such models can be
viewed as partial explanations pointing to causes and mechanisms of phenomena, can
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be primarily descriptions of phenomena or of correlations associated with phenom-
ena, or may involve a mixture of both.1 I argue that these models can aggregate any
correlate or causal determinant of a phenomenon of interest, be it biological, psycho-
logical, social or other, in virtue of a methodological principle of epistemic parity
among the investigative methodologies driving experimental and clinical research
across disciplines. This principle denies empirical justification of the exclusion of
some factors from the model, the segregation of certain kinds of factors into distinct
models, or the layering of factors included in any given model along two or more
levels.2
In Sect. 4, I address two objections to the level-neutrality thesis. First, I address the
possibility that different levels of epistemic confidence are systematically assigned
to findings from different disciplines based on differences in the validity, reliabil-
ity and accuracy of the methods they employ. Such differences would justify an
experimental reductionism whereby the methods of some disciplines are systemat-
ically replaced by methods from other disciplines, ultimately leading to a preferred
level of explanation. My response is that the methods of ‘lower-level’ disciplines
(e.g., biological methods of assessment of subjective experience) cannot systemati-
cally replace the methods of ‘higher-level’ disciplines (e.g., psychological methods)
because the latter are needed to establish the validity of the former. The second objec-
tion is a version of Kim’s argument from causal exclusion. It seems reasonable to
assume that any given multidisciplinary model will ultimately grow to encompass
several layers of causes each seemingly sufficient to account for the same range of
effects on the phenomenon to be explained. I address the objection by drawing a
distinction between evidence for causal relevance and evidence for the complete-
ness, or causal sufficiency of an explanation. I argue that while causal relevance is
enough to warrant supervenience, it does not support conclusive inferences about
causal sufficiency. Without causal sufficiency, there is no reason to assume causal
exclusion.
In Sect. 5, I conclude that we must seek the rationales for accounts and debates
involving levels of explanation and reality elsewhere than empirical research. I
propose that, while empirical research has the internal resources for sustaining
integrative multidisciplinary research, level distinctions reflect the fact that dif-
ferent disciplines rely on local theoretical frameworks which fail to add up to a
coherent unified theory capable of accounting for all the discoveries of empirical
research.
1 The term ‘model’ has many understandings in life sciences alone (Baetu 2014; Bolker 2009; Leonelli
2007), in addition to numerous other characterizations found in other scientific disciplines, philosophy of
science, logic and mathematics. I focus exclusively on multidisciplinary models as characterized above.
2 The notion that empirical claims are not laden by metaphysical assumptions about levels of reality is
by no means new. Logical positivists and, later on, proponents of the identity theory of the mind argued
that the language scientists use to describe empirical findings is topic-neutral (Feigl 1967; Smart 1959).
Unfortunately, this strategy collapsed into a debate about whether the distinctive terminologies of biology
and psychology reflect significant assumptions about differences in the nature of the factors involved
(Rosenthal 1994). What is proposed here is a new approach switching the focus form the language used to
describe empirical claims to the methods used to obtain it.
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2 The puzzle of multidisciplinary research
2.1 The level-laden conception of science
A distinction is commonly drawn between a physical and a phenomenological, or
empirical, level of description, where the former is studied by ‘lower-level’ explana-
tory sciences such as molecular biology, while the latter belongs to psychology and
other ‘higher-level’ descriptive disciplines, such as zoology and embryology. Descrip-
tive sciences tend to rely on direct observations of macro-variables in order to generate
classifications, generalizations and predictions. Explanatory sciences, on the other
hand, introduce a host of micro-entities whose existence can only be indirectly cor-
roborated by sophisticated experimental protocols. The boundaries separating levels
of description can be quite vague, as it is not always clear what counts as direct and
indirect observation, or whether empirical generalizations are devoid of any explana-
tory potential. Nevertheless, the fact that micro-entities are often times hypothesized in
order to provide reductive explanations of the relationships between macro-variables
tends to maintain a separation between the two, the latter constituting the domain of
phenomena to be explained, the former the domain of whatever does the explaining.
While multidisciplinary research may find many natural niches along the poorly
defined borders separating levels of description, there are cases where levels morph into
much stronger distinctions. For example, somatic diseases and biological explanations
are still distinguished from mental diseases and psychological explanations based on
theoretical expectations of what can and cannot interact with the components of a
physiological mechanism. This interaction criterion has been used to reject the notion
that a proper explanation can mix neurological and psychological considerations (Frith
1992, Ch. 3), demand that one must have an appropriate account of how they are related
to one another (Kim 1993), and criticize multifactorial models of disease aggregating
biological and socioeconomic risk factors (Gori 1989; Krieger 1994). In all these cases,
the argument is that psychological and social factors cannot simply be ‘plugged’ into
biological mechanisms, but must first be shown to have a biological basis which may
then be integrated in the biological machinery. As a result, a sharp distinction is drawn
between ‘lower-level’ explanations involving biological mechanisms and the ‘higher-
level’ findings, descriptions and explanations of psychology and sociology.3
Levels of explanation usually go hand in hand with levels of reality. The fact that,
in many cases, it is possible to manipulate micro-entities in order to generate macro-
level changes supports an argument for realism about micro-entities (Hacking 1983,
Ch. 16). This interpretation is widely accepted in biology, which takes biological
mechanisms, including cellular and molecular ones, to be real things rather than mere
explanatory constructs (Craver and Darden 2013, Ch. 6). A realist interpretation of
the levels of explanation conception gives us a ‘soft’ dualist ontology according to
3 Note that there is nothing inherent to mechanistic explanation that assumes or entails such a stratification.
The stratification is the consequence of an independent requirement that the interactions between the parts
of a mechanism must be of a particular type (e.g., mechanical, chemical). This requirement is not assumed
in psychology, sociology and economics, where it is not uncommon to find references to social mechanisms
consisting of individuals interacting according to certain rules.
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which there is a phenomenological/empirical and a physical level of reality. While the
latter is assumed to be dependent on the former, the interaction criterion introduced
earlier prohibits the mixing together of elements belonging to the two levels in the
same mechanism. This promotes a strictly regimented segregation: elements belong-
ing to the ‘lower’ physical level are components of biological mechanisms, while the
elements belonging to the ‘higher’ phenomenological level correspond to descrip-
tions of the phenomena for which these mechanisms are responsible. This kind of
dichotomy is often times assumed when mental diseases and biological explanations
are distinguished from somatic diseases and psychological explanations (Kendler and
Campbell 2009). In a more drastic version, it is argued that the phenomenological
level of conscious experience and the biological level of mechanistic explanation are
separated by an unbridgeable explanatory gap which forces us either to accept a dualist
position contrasting external reality to an irreducible subject-bounded mental reality
(Chalmers 1996, Ch. 4; Levine 1983), or to eliminate the phenomenological in favor
of the physical (Dennett 1996, Ch. 11).
2.2 Integration and multidisciplinary research
If we accept this level-laden conception of science,4 it is not clear what kind of inte-
grative work can be done by multidisciplinary models. Either these models specify
how psychological and social factors interact with biological mechanisms, or they are
nothing else but a disjoint patchwork of incompatible perspectives. Multidisciplinarity
may be understood along the lines of a pragmatic pluralism alternating between dis-
tinct disciplinary perspectives, but this is not the same as a novel, genuinely integrative
perspective.
If pressed on the issue, researchers often point in the direction of yet to be discov-
ered “biological substrates of specific psychological processes” (Craig and Versloot
2011, 27). The suggestion here is that the explanatory gap between the biological
and the psychological will eventually be closed, most likely in the reductive sense
that psychological determinants will be someday be accountable in biological terms.
However, if we resist for a moment the temptation of reductionism as a path out of
the difficulty, we soon discover that there is a second answer available in the scientific
literature. If we ask “What can possibly bring together considerations as remote as
‘increased nociceptor activity’, ‘catastrophizing’ and ‘spousal support’?”, the answer
we are given is that all three are causal determinants of pain experience specifying “tar-
gets for different forms of therapeutic intervention” (Craig and Versloot 2011, 27). In
other words, it is possible to alter pain experience by experimentally intervening on any
of these determinants, irrespective of whether we may think of them as being ‘lower’
or ‘higher-level’. Furthermore, some meta-analysis studies suggest that multimodal
4 I explicitly exclude from this conception levels of composition, which can be understood in strictly empir-
ical terms (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, Chs. 3–4; Wimsatt 1972). For instance, brains are experimentally
decomposable into neurons and neural pathways, while pain experience can be experimentally dissociated
into a sensory-discriminative component capturing the intensity, location, quality and duration of the pain,
and an affective-motivational component referring to the unpleasantness of the experience. By themselves,
levels of composition don’t entail any explanatory gaps or ontological discontinuities in the fabric of reality.
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therapies simultaneously targeting several determinants, for instance by combining
pharmaceutical interventions with cognitive-behavioral therapy and social environ-
ment interventions, can be more effective than single-level interventions (Rossy et al.
1999). This indicates that factors we may take to belong to distinct levels can interfere
with each other’s ability to alter pain experience.
What is particularly appealing about this second answer is that, unlike the yet to
be achieved goals of reductionism, it is firmly grounded in the experimental evidence
available today. From the standpoint of empirical research, multidisciplinary models
do genuine integrative work, albeit not by providing a unified explanation of how
psychosocial factors interact with biological mechanisms, but rather by acknowledging
evidence that the phenomenon of pain is causally determined by both biological and
psychosocial factors and by attempting to summarize what is known about these
factors and their interactions. In the remainder of the paper, I develop and defend a
methodological argument justifying the aggregation of empirical findings irrespective
of the level distinctions that may separate the disciplines in which these findings have
been generated.
3 A methodological argument for level-neutrality
3.1 The interventionist account of causation
According to an interventionist account of causation, “causal (as opposed to merely
correlational) relationships are relationships that describe what will happen to some
variables (effects) when we manipulate or intervene on others (causes). To say that a
relationship is causal is to say that it is exploitable for purposes of manipulation and
control in a way that merely correlational relationships are not” (Woodward 2008).
Ideally, evidence for causation requires that an intervention on causal factor X must
change the outcome Y without changing any other variable that is a cause of Y —that
is, without directly changing Y , or any other variable along the causal pathway from
X to Y , or by simultaneously intervening on convergent causal pathways leading to
Y (Woodward 2003, pp. 94–99); this is meant to ensure that X , and not some other
variable, is the difference maker targeted by the intervention.
The account captures the distinction between experiments and observational
studies. For example, an epidemiological study may demonstrate that, in a given pop-
ulation, a particular DNA sequence is associated with a given phenotype in a statically
significant way. We may conclude that the two are strongly correlated, but there is no
conclusive evidence for causation. Two main problems arise with strictly observational
studies. First, there is no control group to demonstrate that genotype and phenotype
are not effects of a common causal background. Second, there is nothing to support
the claim that the genotype causes the phenotype and not the other way around. Asso-
ciation is inconclusive evidence for causation in the sense that it does not allow us
to discriminate between several interpretations, of which only one corresponds to the
desired causal claim.
In contrast, an experimental intervention can provide conclusive evidence for cau-
sation because it allows us to discriminate and reject alternative interpretations of the
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results. For example, a gene knockout experiment may reveal that if the DNA sequence
is mutated or deleted, then the phenotype is altered; this establishes order of causation.
Given that the change in phenotype does not happen in the genetically unmodified,
but otherwise identical control system, we may conclude that the difference maker
is the DNA sequence and not another cause. In the converse experiment, when the
sequence is restored, the phenotype is restored. Again, the temporal sequence is clear,
and given that the genetically modified system does not recover on its own, we can
again conclude that the relevant difference maker is that sequence and not some other
cause.
3.2 The interventionist argument for the level-neutrality of causal explanations
James Woodward argues that, in the context of an interventionist account of causa-
tion, nothing justifies giving “automatic or a priori preference to any particular grain or
‘level’ of causal description over any other”; furthermore, “there is no bar in principle
to mixing variables that are at what might seem to be different ‘levels’ in causal claims”
(2008, 222). The argument rests on a methodological consideration: if an intervention-
ist account is all that is needed to justify claims about causation in empirical science,
and if the same method of ideal interventions is successfully applied in all cases, then
there is no reason why some causal determinants should be assigned a distinct status.
Causal models are level-neutral in the sense that they can amalgamate any kind of
determinant that satisfies the desiderata of a controlled intervention experiment.
This realization led Woodward (2008), Campbell (2008, 2013) and (Kendler and
Campbell 2009) to further argue that in some fields of investigation, such as psychiatry,
there are no preferred levels of explanation favoring particular kinds of determinants.
This conclusion rests on the fact that an interventionist account of causation provides
at the same time an account of experimental methodology, namely the desiderata a
study must satisfy in order to demonstrate causation, as well as an account of scientific
explanation, where explanations are construed as answers to ‘what-if-things-had-been-
different’ questions (Woodward 2003, Ch. 5).
3.3 Disentangling methodology and explanation
According to the interventionist argument, level-neutrality is a peculiarity of expla-
nations in disciplines where experimental results that satisfy the desiderata of
interventionist approaches are accepted as satisfactory explanations marking the end-
point of scientific inquiry. This is rather restrictive. Causal models are explicitly
recognized as end-goals of scientific inquiry only in the context of clinically ori-
ented disciplines and approaches, such as epidemiology and evidence-based medicine,
notorious for their pragmatic emphasis on ‘what works in practice’. They are not
the gold standard of scientific explanation in science, as reflected by the hypothe-
ses driving most biomedical research or the kind of explanations one typically finds
in science textbooks. Yet, despite this qualification, it would be wrong to conclude
that causal models are absent or less important outside clinical research. Quite on
the contrary, causal models are widespread across sciences and play a crucial role in
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discovery, experimentation and the development of medical and technological appli-
cations. Causal models are extremely common in basic science, albeit not as a form
of explanation, but rather as attempts to summarize what is currently known about the
causal determinants of a phenomenon.
It is therefore desirable to disentangle claims about experimental methodology from
claims about what counts as an acceptable scientific explanation. Focusing on exper-
imental methodology has two important benefits. First, there is a gain in generality.
An interventionist account of causation captures a widespread commitment to exper-
imental research going well beyond the explanatory ideals of clinical research. Thus,
level-neutrality becomes a general feature of causal models systematizing experimen-
tal results, rather than remaining confined to a particular set of disciplines and their
explanations. Second, there is a shift from explanation to empirical findings. While the
level-neutrality of causal models as explanations is interesting because it reveals the
non-reductive character of explanations typically associated with clinical sciences, the
level-neutrality of causal models as compilations of empirical findings is interesting
because it reveals an important way in which empirical research is independent from
theoretical and metaphysical assumptions about levels of explanation and reality. An
important consequence of this independence is the ability to integrate findings under
the methodological umbrella of empirical research whether or not currently available
theoretical frameworks can keep up with the demands of such integration.
3.4 Level-neutrality as a general feature of empirical research
With the explanatory commitments of interventionism out of the way, we can now
inspect more closely the core methodological argument behind the level-neutrality
thesis. The argument relies on two premises: (1) the different causes included in a
model target the same effect; and (2) the different causes must be established with a
similar degree of epistemic certainty. However, it turns out that these two premises can
also be used to argue that experimental results in general can be combined in a level
neutral way. Therefore, under the assumption that the interventionist argument for
level-neutrality is sound, level-neutrality holds for experimental results in general.5 I
will begin by discussing the first premise in this section, and continue with a discussion
of the second premise in Sect. 3.5.
The first thing worth noting is that interventionist desiderata are insufficient to
justify the aggregation of causal factors in the same model. One can easily imagine
a scenario where two distinct experiments involving ideal interventions demonstrate
the causal relevance of a biological and a psychological factor to pain intensity, but
in each case pain is measured in a different way. In such a scenario, it is not imme-
diately obvious that we can legitimately aggregate the two determinants in the same
model. Interventionist criteria only assess evidence for causal relationships. If the same
method of ideal interventions is applied to a psychological and a biological factor and
a measurable effect is observed in each case, then we can conclude that the former is
5 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this concise formulation of the argument.
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as much as a cause as the latter. However, this tells us nothing about both being causes
of the same effect.
Something else is required, namely evidence that different findings are about the
same phenomenon. This is achieved by means of standardization (e.g., standardized
questionnaires, genetically uniform organisms) and operationalization (the step-by-
step instructions detailing experimental procedures in the ‘Materials and Methods’
section of scientific articles). These practices specify the exact nature of interventions
and increase the likelihood that the test and control conditions are identical except for
the variables under direct intervention, as required by interventionism. However, they
also aim to ensure that phenomena, objects of study, experimental setups and methods
of investigation can be identified and replicated by different research teams (Ankeny
2001; Gossel 1992; Müller-Wille 2007; Weber 2008). In turn, findings generated in
the context of a standardized and operationalized experimental setup are more likely
to be about ‘the same thing’, and therefore can be directly compared and aggregated
in the same model (Baetu 2014).6
The implication here is that what glues together the various elements of a model is
not evidence for causality simpliciter, but evidence for causal relevance with respect
to the same phenomenon. This suggests that level-neutrality is not a unique feature
of causal models, but rather a general feature of models broadly construed to include
descriptions of phenomena, webs of correlated factors and causal determinants. For
example, just as the causal contributions of inflammatory responses and anticipation
to pain experience are combined in the same causal model of chronic pain, statistically
significant neural and cultural correlates of pain experience are jointly considered as
empirical constraints a successful explanation of pain should take into consideration,
while physiological and psychological symptoms are aggregated in the same descrip-
tion of the phenomenon of pain.
The argument can be further generalized. Models may also mix correlated and
causal determinants, along with occasional bits and pieces of better understood
mechanistic details.7 The key requirement is that they are all correlates, causes
and mechanistic details of the same phenomenon. This is consistent with a well-
documented sequence of events in the lifecycle of many research projects in biomedical
sciences, namely a gradual progression from an initial fixing of explananda as descrip-
tions of phenomena to an expansion into wider webs of correlated factors (Bogen and
Woodward 1988; Leonelli 2009; McAllister 1997), which in turn provide a pool of
putative determinants subsequently tested for causal relevance (Baetu 2012; Craver
6 In biomedical sciences, empirical findings are often aggregated in the same model in virtue of extrapola-
tions to systems and situations others than those actually assessed in a study. In such cases, it is important to
establish the external validity of experimental results (Baetu 2016a; Germain and Baetu 2017; Steel 2007).
7 The latter amount to ‘higher resolution’ descriptions of causal determinants and their interactions.
Mechanistic details may include information about the spatiotemporal organization of causal pathways
(compartmentalization, differential gradients, temporal dynamics), the nature of causal interactions (geo-
metrical fit, phosphorylation, diffusion, electron exchange), and functional role ascriptions based on how a
phenomenon changes qualitatively and quantitatively in response to various types of interventions on causal
determinants. These details typically rely on an uncontroversial interpretation of experimental results, and
are included in the model strictly on the basis of their causal relevance.
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2007, Chs. 2–4; Woodward 2002). Ultimately, knowledge of causal determinants pro-
vides the materials for hypothesizing mechanistic explanations, as well as a set of
empirical constraints that limits the space of possible mechanisms and against which
hypothesized mechanisms can be tested (Craver and Darden 2013, Chs. 7–9; Darden
2006, Ch. 12).
On this account, multidisciplinary models are expected to fall on a more or less con-
tinuous spectrum between descriptions of phenomena and mechanistic explanations.
This may seem to include a lot of things, but in the end the difference between these
elements hinges on experimental limitations. Any clinical study aims to demonstrate
causation, but often times can only gather evidence for correlation. In basic science,
the gold standard is detailed mechanistic explanation providing a step by step descrip-
tion of how an organized set of entities interact in order to produce a phenomenon of
interest, but the experimental evidence may only allow for the reconstruction of rough
causal pathways surrounded by a halo of potentially relevant correlates whose exact
mechanistic roles are still unknown.
This description matches the composition of biopsychosocial models of pain. While
some models aim primarily to integrate known and suspected determinants of pain–
e.g., the Glasgow (Waddell 1987) and the stress-diathesis (Turk 2002) models–, others
may include putative mechanistic details–e.g., associative learning and the resulting
fear avoidance behaviors (Flor et al. 2002) or mechanisms underpinning psychological
and physiological comorbidities such as depression and stress (Duric and McCarson
2005).
3.5 The requirement of epistemic parity
The key intuition underlying the interventionist argument is that each element of a
causal model (each causal claim about a given phenomenon) is equally well supported
by an experiment involving controlled interventions. This ensures that no causal factor
can be dismissed. Conversely, disparities in terms of empirical support undermine
level-neutrality by placing an emphasis on some factors at the expense of others.
Thus, epistemic parity among the various elements of a model is a second crucial
requirement for level-neutrality. The question that arises now is whether epistemic
parity is warranted by the satisfaction of general criteria for evaluating empirical
findings, or by the more specific desiderata of interventionism. I offer two arguments
in defense of the former, more general view.
First, the strength of the evidence for causal relevance varies depending on how
closely real experiments satisfy the requirements for ideal (controlled) interventions.
Interventionist accounts of causation assume a sharp distinction between experiments
involving ideal or quasi-ideal interventions (experimental interventions, clinical trials)
and studies documenting correlations (descriptions of phenomena, imaging studies,
observational studies). In practice, however, research may fall somewhere in between
these two categories. Different experimental designs provide more or less conclusive
evidence for causal relevance depending on how successful they are in eliminating
or controlling for confounding variables. For instance, many observational studies
do include controls, but fail to demonstrate that controls are identical with the test
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condition except for the variable under manipulation. For this reason, randomized
controlled trials are considered to be superior to comparative approaches such as
cohort and case-control studies (Guyatt et al. 2015).
Likewise, in basic research, some interventions may clearly demonstrate causal
relevance to a specific outcome (e.g., gene knockouts), others may lead to a variety
of outcomes making it difficult to disentangle between alternate causal interpretations
(e.g., gene knockouts resulting in pleiotropic effects), while some experiments are
plagued by uncertainties about whether interventions cause the observed outcomes
(e.g., neuroimaging studies). At the limit, interventions may not be conducted at all
despite overwhelming evidence for strong association (e.g., amyloid deposits and
Alzheimer’s disease). Yet even if different experimental setups may vary in their
ability to demonstrate causation, all of the above constitute scientifically acceptable
findings about a given phenomenon and provide evidence for relationships between
factors investigated by different disciplines.
My second argument is that interventionism cannot satisfy the requirement of epis-
temic parity without ultimately relying on the messier assortment of criteria used to
evaluate empirical findings in general. Experiments supporting causal claims rely on
techniques (instruments, tests, assays, protocols) for measuring specific factors. Dif-
ferent techniques are required for different factors, and the same techniques can be
shared by distinct experimental designs aiming to generate evidence for distinct kinds
of claims (e.g., causation vs correlation). A distinction must therefore be made between
the extent to which a particular experimental design can support claims about causal
relationships, and the extent to which a particular technique is suited for measuring
a given factor. As discussed above, some experimental designs are better suited for
demonstrating causation than others. However, the suitability of a particular design for
demonstrating causation doesn’t tell us anything about the suitability and quality of
the techniques used to measure specific factors. For example, the fact that two experi-
mental designs satisfy interventionist desiderata does not demonstrate that the quality
of the evidence for the causal relevance of inflammation to pain is on par with that for
the causal relevance of anxiety to pain. The interventionist account doesn’t tell us how
to compare findings generated by the detection of inflammation using morphological
and molecular markers with that generated by psychometric tests assessing anxiety.
The above complications indicate that interventionist desiderata ensure epistemic
parity only in conjunction with more fundamental considerations such as reproducibil-
ity, reliability, validity and accuracy, which not only apply to empirical findings at
large, but also trump the more narrowly focused interventionist criteria.8 Woodward
acknowledges the more fundamental role of these considerations in establishing the
epistemic trustworthiness of various causal claims when he qualifies his statement
8 Reproducibility increases the likelihood that relevant correlations and causal contributions can be dif-
ferentiated from the background noise of chance events and experimental error (Baetu 2013; Bogen and
Woodward 1988). When results are well-established, reproducibility can be used as a reliability and accu-
racy test for calibrating or troubleshooting measurement assays and associated instruments, techniques and
experimental setups (Franklin 1986, Chs. 6–7). Validity encompasses evidence that the test is measuring
what is supposed to measure and may be established by a systematic cross-referencing of methods and their
results (Culp 1994, 1995; Hacking 1983, Ch. 10; Weber 2005, Ch. 9; Wimsatt 1981). Accuracy encompasses
sensitivity and specificity, which are measures of the ability to rule out false negatives and false positives.
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about mixing lower and higher-level factors by adding “as long as it is true that inter-
ventions that change their values are reliably and stably correlated with changes in their
putative effects” (2008, 222). Indeed, if the results of a particular study demonstrating
a causal relationship cannot be reproduced, then it doesn’t matter that the study sat-
isfies interventionist desiderata (Open Science Collaboration 2015). Consistent lack
of reproducibility by studies aiming to replicate the finding using the same setup and
techniques is a strong indication that something went wrong in the original study. By
comparison, a consistently replicated correlation is a trustworthy finding; if the two
findings concern the same phenomenon, researchers will typically include the latter in
their models, and exclude the former. Likewise, findings amply cross-referenced by
means of different methods and findings obtained by more thoroughly validated and
accurate methods are given more epistemic credence than findings not corroborated by
alternative methods or findings relying on poorly validated and less accurate methods.
This is true whether or not the studies satisfy the conditions for ideal interventions.9
3.6 In summary
The emerging picture is that of a nested, triple understanding of the notion of level-
neutrality. Even though different disciplines rely on different experimental setups,
instruments and techniques required to perform interventions and measure various
factors, multidisciplinary models remain level-neutral in as much as they aggregate
correlates and causal determinants of a given phenomenon discovered by methods that
satisfy the same basic requirements of good experimental practice. This notion of level-
neutrality reveals an important way in which empirical research is independent from
theoretical frameworks and metaphysical assumptions about levels of explanation and
reality associated with particular disciplines.
Causal models and the causal component of multidisciplinary models may further
satisfy the more specific desiderata associated with ideal interventions in addition to
the basic requirements of experimental practice. This supports the view that there
is nothing intrinsic to experimental results that can justify a sharp contrast between
intra- and inter-level causality, which is one of the main aims of Woodward’s argument.
Finally, in as much as causal models amount to explanations, level-neutrality reveals
the non-reductive character of explanations in clinical sciences, which don’t distin-
guish between somatic and psychogenic etiology/pathology, as argued by Campbell
and Kendler.
4 Answers to two objections
4.1 Experimental reductionism
An immediate objection against level-neutrality is that epistemic parity is never under-
stood as strict equality and is certainly not taken to entail that all empirical findings are
9 Similar qualifications are made in respect to epidemiological models, most notably in respect to the
strength (statistical significance) and consistency (reliability) of correlations (Hill 1965).
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equally trustworthy. As pointed out earlier, consistently replicated results are given
priority over unreproducible findings, results obtained by means of more thoroughly
validated tests trump the results of less well validated tests, and more accurate tests
are preferred over less accurate ones. Could it be then that systematic inequalities
can create a bias such that results produced by means of thoroughly validated, more
reliable or more accurate methodologies associated with some disciplines are likely
to be better represented in multidisciplinary models or even trump weaker results
obtained by less thoroughly validated, less reliable and accurate methodologies of
other disciplines?
For instance, despite the insistence that medical practice should embrace biopsy-
chosocial models, it might be objected that there is a stronger correlation between
‘heart attacks’ and biological factors such as myocardial ischemia, electrical insta-
bility and cell damage, than between ‘heart attacks’ and social situations, such as
intense grief. Also, the methods for measuring biological factors such as electrical
instability are more reliable and enjoy extensive validation as compared to those for
measuring grief. Issues can also arise from differences in sensitivity and specificity.
For example, let us assume that a social factor, for instance spousal support, involves
physical contact, such as a pat on the back. If it turns out that the causal contribution of
spousal support is specifically mediated by physical contact irrespective of the social
context, then we can dispense altogether of the less specific social-level description
and associated methods of assessment, and replace it with the more specific biological-
level description and associated experimental methodology. Thus, what is suggested
above is that different disciplines and their empirical findings are assigned different
levels of epistemic confidence depending on the degree to which they satisfy the basic
requirements of experimental research. If these differences are significant enough, we
can expect an unequal representation of empirical findings favoring findings gener-
ated by some disciplines, which are in turn more likely to be taken into consideration
by proposed explanations, thus leading to distinctions in terms of levels of explana-
tion.10
It seems undeniable that, at least in some situations, this is indeed the case. However,
I would like to suggest that there cannot be a complete replacement of the experimental
methodologies of one discipline with those of another discipline. Molecular biology
never fades into chemistry for the simple reason that molecular biologists are not
studying molecules for the sake of studying molecules; they are studying the role of
molecules vis-à-vis biological activity (Astbury 1961). It is inconceivable that one
can study molecular mechanisms without relying on experimental techniques specific
to biology in order to detect and measure the biological phenomena produced by
these mechanisms. Interventions on molecular components (gene knockouts, enzyme
inhibitors, etc.) must make a difference for biological activity (wing development,
immune response, cell growth, etc.).
A similar comment applies to psychological and psychiatric research. For instance,
the fact that surgical interventions (Dong et al. 1996) or damage to specific brain
areas (Berthier et al. 1988) can induce the dissociation of a sensory-discriminative
10 I would like to thank Takuya Niikawa for clarifying this very helpful example.
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component of pain experience from an affective-motivational component was taken
as an indication that the nociceptive input is processed along partially distinct neural
pathways. Converse imaging studies of subjects under hypnotic suggestion fur-
ther supported this hypothesis by demonstrating distinct neural correlates matching
surgically-induced dissociation of the two components of pain experience (Rainville
et al. 1997). While new methods from neuroscience are introduced in pain research,
nothing here indicates that psychological methods of investigation are in any way
replaced by biological ones. This should not be particularly surprising, given that
researchers must demonstrate the causal relevance of biological structures to psycho-
logical activity, in this case changes in overall pain experience or its more specific
sensory, affective and cognitive dimensions.
What about cases where psychological diagnosis and its experimental protocols
(e.g., self-report, cognitive tasks, behavioral descriptions) were in fact replaced by
biological ones (e.g., neurological and physiological correlates, molecular mark-
ers)? Various examples come to mind, such as the tracking of eye movements as
a proxy for measuring attention, or cortisol levels as a measure of psychological
stress. It is tempting to think that because ‘lower-level’ biological forms of assess-
ment cannot be easily faked or distorted, they are preferable to their ‘higher-level’
psychological counterparts. There is nothing wrong with this kind of reasoning. In
the case of pain assessment, it is certainly the case that self-reports are susceptible
to malingering, as well as to over and under-report, a state of affairs that motivates a
legitimate quest for higher specificity forms of assessment less susceptible to manip-
ulation by patients and less open to interpretation by clinicians. Nevertheless, claims
about replacement and elimination stem from superficial observations of what clin-
icians and scientists do, without taking into consideration the scientific justification
of these practices. If the ultimate goal is to study psychological phenomena, then
physiological tests must be validated against psychological ones. It makes no sense
to talk about ‘physiological correlates’ and ‘molecular markers’ if said correlates
and markers fail to correlate and act as indicators of subjective experience. Even in
cases where biological tests did replace psychological tests in clinical and experi-
mental practice, this replacement was at some point justified by a set of validation
procedures whereby the physiological tests were shown to consistently give the same
results as a set of psychological tests conducted under rigorously controlled situations
typically not achieved in most clinical and experimental setups. In such cases, phys-
iological tests are in fact extensions of earlier psychological tests motivated by the
discovery of biological factors correlated with or causally relevant to a psychological
phenomenon.11
I propose therefore that, because the methods of assessment associated with what
are commonly perceived as ‘higher-level’ disciplines can never be fully substituted by
those of ‘lower-level’ disciplines, there is a strong motivation for maintaining a high
standard of experimental research across disciplines by developing and perfecting
highly reliable, valid and accurate tests.
11 The validation of cortisol secretion patterns as biomarkers of psychological stress (Smyth et al. 1997)
illustrates this point.
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4.2 Causal exclusion
The second objection I want to address is a version of the causal exclusion argument.
A common rationale for maintaining epistemic and metaphysical distinctions between
lower and higher levels stems from a widespread physicalist view that higher-level
properties or states are determined by lower-level ones, as assumed in supervenience
and realization accounts. One implication of physicalism is that if a causal model
cites higher-level factors, then the model is expected to expand ‘downwards’ in order
to include the lower-level factors determining the higher-level ones. For instance, if
certain forms of learning and memory are causally relevant to pain experience, then
the underlying cellular mechanisms of long term-potentiation will also be relevant;
and if long-term potentiation is relevant, then so will be the underlying molecular
mechanisms regulating the expression of NMDA receptors. Conversely, a model citing
lower-level factors may also expand ‘upwards’, in order to include a variety of higher-
level factors realized by lower-level factors, which in turn may open new avenues for
research and treatment.
While there are experimental limits to how far a model can actually expand, there is
an in principle possibility that any given multidisciplinary model will ultimately grow
to encompass several layers of causes—for instance, a ‘higher-level’ set of psycholog-
ical determinants supervening on a ‘lower-level’ set of biological causes–, where each
layer seems sufficient to account for the same range of effects on the phenomenon to
be explained. If one layer of determinants suffices to cause and explain a given effect
on the phenomenon of interest and if we further dismiss the possibility of systematic
causal overdetermination, it would seem that any additional causal and explanatory
contributions from other layers are redundant. Thus, one may worry that as exper-
imental knowledge accumulates, multidisciplinary models are bound to disintegrate
into a multitude of competing single-level explanations.12
Many authors dismiss the genuine possibility of multiple explanations of the same
explanandum. Jaegwon Kim famously defends a principle of causal exclusion accord-
ing to which “[n]o event can be given more than one complete and independent
explanation” (1993, 239). In turn, causal exclusion may serve to justify either a reduc-
tionism to lower-level causal explanations (Bickle 1998, Ch. 1; Kim 2005, Ch. 4),
or antireductionist approaches defending the explanatory autonomy of sciences deal-
ing with higher-level factors (Fodor 1974; Putnam 1975). One way or another, the
level-neutrality thesis is undermined.
In response to these worries, I argue that the problem of causal exclusion does not
concern multidisciplinary models because they are not complete explanations demon-
strating the causal sufficiency of any particular cluster of causal determinants. In his
1993 paper, Kim points out that there can be two “correct explanations only if either at
least one of the two is incomplete or one is dependent on the other” (1993, 257). Unfor-
12 A similar argument can be made in the case of correlations by imagining a case where both the higher
and the lower-level factors stand in law-like relationships with respect to the phenomenon of interest. It
would seem then that either set of factors is sufficient for deriving equally detailed and accurate descriptions
of the phenomenon of interest, thus pointing to two competing deductive-nomological explanations of the
same phenomenon.
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tunately, he does not provide a clear account of what counts as a causal explanation,
and remains silent about the criteria for judging if such an explanation is complete. In
a more recent work (2005, Chs. 1–2), he makes the interesting suggestion that causa-
tion should be understood in the stronger sense of “generation, or effective production
and determination” rather than “mere counterfactual dependence” (2005, 18). While
Kim is probably referring to a metaphysical claim about the nature of causation, the
distinction has an epistemic counterpart capturing an important difference between
causal models and mechanistic explanations. Specifying the nature of this difference
can provide a much clearer characterization of the kind of causal explanations preva-
lent in the life sciences, as well as a clearer understanding of what it means for such
explanations to be complete.
Some of the most celebrated scientific explanations in the life sciences amount to
descriptions of mechanisms responsible for the production of phenomena (Bechtel
2006, 2008; Craver 2007; Craver and Darden 2013; Darden 2006; Wimsatt 1972).
Several characterizations of mechanisms are available, all hinging on the general idea
that mechanisms are organized systems of parts causally responsible for producing
or maintaining phenomena (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Glennan 1996, 2002;
Illari and Williamson 2011; Machamer et al. 2000). Even though there is a significant
overlap between causal models and mechanistic explanations—which should not be
surprising given that the former provide the materials and constraints for hypothesizing
the latter—the two diverge in several ways, the most obvious one being the shift from
causal relevance, which indicates that a phenomenon is susceptible to manipulation
via interventions on individual causal determinants or mechanistic components, to
the notion of productiveness, which indicates that the mechanistic system as a whole
is required to produce a phenomenon (Machamer et al. 2000). Ideally, a mechanis-
tic explanation is complete when it describes a mechanism that is both sufficient to
produce and is actually producing the phenomenon in a given experimental setup or
biological context (Craver 2006). Sufficiency is understood here in engineering terms,
as the ability to construct, physically (e.g., an in vitro reconstitution experiment) or
in silico (e.g., by means of a computer simulation), a system capable of producing
the phenomenon of interest starting from parts performing the activities, possessing
the properties and being organized as specified in the mechanistic explanation (Baetu
2015, b; Craver and Darden 2013, Ch. 6; Morange 2009; Weber 2005, Ch. 4).
In contrast, causal models don’t provide information about causal sufficiency. That
an intervention on determinant X results in a change in phenomenon Y demonstrates
causal relevance, but does not prove that X is sufficient to produce Y , or that X is the
only determinant of Y . If this is true, then aggregating causally relevant factors into ever
more elaborate causal models cannot get us any closer to proving causal sufficiency
either (Baetu 2016b). If anything, causal models are bound to remain open-ended, as
new causal factors (e.g., new drugs and technologies allowing for novel experimental
interventions) can always be appended to the model.
The implication here is that multidisciplinary models fall short of complete
mechanistic explanations and therefore cannot conclusively support claims about
causal sufficiency. Hence, even if multidisciplinary models expand as postulated by
physicalist accounts, this does not automatically entail that such an expansion has
the epistemic and metaphysical significance associated with debates about causal
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sufficiency, explanatory completeness and their implications for reductionism and
antireductionism.13
5 Concluding remarks
Using biopsychosocial models of pain as a case study, I defended the level-neutrality
of multidisciplinary models. I argued that these models are the epistemic products
of empirical research, which neither assumes, nor justifies conceptual or ontological
distinctions between levels of description, explanation and reality. The main argument
in support of the integration of empirical findings from different disciplines investi-
gating the same phenomenon is grounded in the uniformity of criteria for evaluating
empirical claims about correlates, causes and mechanisms. The implication of this
thesis is that problems such as inter-level causation, reductionism, and dualism stem
from theoretical, rather than empirical considerations. I take this to be a very inter-
esting and significant conclusion, since it suggests that experimental science has the
internal resources to promote integrative research which is immune to many of the
typical difficulties, objections and debates in contemporary philosophy of science and
philosophy of mind.
I am not claiming or suggesting that multidisciplinary models somehow succeed in
addressing the explanatory gaps underlying level distinctions. I am very well aware of
the fact that researchers face a real theoretical impasse. There is no biopsychosocial
theory accounting for the causal contributions of psychological and social factors as
‘fundamental’ constituents in the same way chemical interactions are the basic build-
ing blocks of molecular biology. Nor there seems to be any systematic way in which
psychological and social factors can be analyzed into finer-grained substrates of a
mechanical or chemical sort, which could then receive the same theoretical treatment
as mainstream physiological and molecular mechanisms. Given the absence of a uni-
fied theoretical framework for conceptualizing biopsychosocial interactions, be it of
a holistic or reductive variety, it seems inevitable that pain determinants remain frag-
mented into biological, psychological and social theoretical kinds as they become part
of distinct, yet incomplete biological, psychological and social explanatory perspec-
tives on pain experience. Rather, what I am claiming is that the scientific understanding
of psychological phenomena is subjected to an ongoing process of multidisciplinary
13 Craver (2007, 223) offers a different answer to the problem of causal exclusion, arguing that “there are
generalizations expressing contrastive relations of causal relevance that are true of realized properties and
that are not true of their realizers”. Woodward’s (2008, 249–50) response follows a similar line of argu-
mentation, emphasizing that information about causes and effects should be presented in a “parsimonious
way” in order to avoid that “certain candidates for causes are too detailed or specific for the effects we
want explained” or vice versa. Note, however, that it is not clear how these epistemic virtues fit with the
more fundamental requirements for reproducibility, validity and accuracy driving experimental and clinical
research. Reproducibility implies a minimal degree of regularity (Baetu 2013), but it is not clear whether
this amounts to the kind of generality and parsimony Craver and Woodward have in mind. Validity and
accuracy, on the other hand, may and often do favor less general causal dependencies, especially when the
issue of external validity arises (Baetu 2016a; Germain and Baetu 2017).
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integration driven by experimental findings despite the fact that theoretical frameworks
lag behind, remaining fragmented among the disciplines involved.
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tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
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source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Ankeny, R. (2001). Model organisms as models: Understanding the lingua franca of the human genome
project. Philosophy of Science, 68, S251–S261.
Asmundson, G. J. G., & Wright, K. D. (2004). Biopsychosocial approaches to pain. In T. Hadjistavropoulos
& K. D. Craig (Eds.), Pain: Psychological perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Astbury, W. (1961). Molecular biology or ultrastructural biology? Nature, 190(4781), 1124.
Baetu, T. M. (2012). Filling in the mechanistic details: Two-variable experiments as tests for constitutive
relevance. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2(3), 337–353.
Baetu, T. M. (2013). Chance, experimental reproducibility, and mechanistic regularity. International Studies
in History and Philosophy of Science, 27(3), 255–273.
Baetu, T. M. (2014). Models and the mosaic of scientific knowledge. The case of immunology. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 45, 49–56.
Baetu, T. M. (2015a). The completeness of mechanistic explanations. Philosophy of Science, 82(5), 775–
786.
Baetu, T. M. (2015). From mechanisms to mathematical models and back to mechanisms: Quantitative
mechanistic explanations. In P.-A. Braillard & C. Malaterre (Eds.), Explanation in biology. An enquiry
into the diversity of explanatory patterns in the life sciences (pp. 345–363). Dordrecht: Springer.
Baetu, T. M. (2016a). The big picture: The problem of extrapolation in basic research. British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 67(4), 941–964.
Baetu, T. M. (2016b). From interventions to mechanistic explanations. Synthese, 193, 3311–3327.
Bechtel, W. (2006). Discovering cell mechanlisms: The creation of modern cell biology. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. New York:
Routledge.
Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36, 421–441.
Bechtel, W., & Richardson, R. (2010). Discovering complexity: Decomposition and localization as strategies
in scientific research. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Berthier, M., Starkstein, S., & Leiguarda, R. (1988). Asymbolia for pain: A sensory-limbic disconnection
syndrome. Annals of Neurology, 24(1), 41–49.
Bickle, J. (1998). Psychoneural reduction: The new wave. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the phenomena. The Philosophical Review, 97(3), 303–352.
Bolker, J. (2009). Exemplary and surrogate models: Two modes of representation in biology. Perspectives
in Biology and Medicine, 52(4), 485–499.
Broadbent, A. (2013). Philosophy of epidemiology. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Campbell, J. (2008). Causation in psychiatry. In K. Kendler & J. Parnas (Eds.), Philosophical issues in
psychiatry (pp. 196–216). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Campbell, J. (2013). Causation and mechanisms in psychiatry. In K. W. M. Fulford, M. Davies, G. Graham,
J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini, & T. Thornton (Eds.), Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry (pp.
935–949). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craig, K. D., & Versloot, J. (2011). Psychosocial perspectives on chronic pain. In M. E. Lynch, K. D. Craig,
& P. W. H. Peng (Eds.), Clinical pain management: A practical guide. Oxford: Blackwell.
Craver, C. (2006). When mechanistic models explain. Synthese, 153, 355–376.
123
Synthese
Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford: Claren-
don Press.
Craver, C., & Darden, L. (2013). In search of biological mechanisms: Discoveries across the life sciences.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Culp, S. (1994). Defending robustness: The bacterial mesosome as a test case. In D. Hull, M. Forbes, & R.
Burian (Eds.), PSA 1994 (pp. 47–57). East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.
Culp, S. (1995). Objectivity in Experimental inquiry: Breaking data-technique circles. Philosophy of Sci-
ence, 62, 430–450.
Darden, L. (2006). Reasoning in biological discoveries: Essays on mechanisms, interfield relations, and
anomaly resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1996). Content and consciousness (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Dong, W. K., Hayashi, T., Roberts, V. J., Fusco, B. M., & Chudler, E. H. (1996). Behavioral outcome of
posterior parietal cortex injury in the monkey. Pain, 64(3), 579–587.
Duric, V., & McCarson, K. E. (2005). Hippocampal neurokinin-1 receptor and brain-derived neurotrophic
factor gene expression is decreased in rat models of pain and stress. Neuroscience, 133, 999–1006.
Engel, G. L. (1977). The need for a new medical model: A challenge for biomedicine. Science, 196(4286),
129–136.
Engel, G. L. (1980). The clinical application of the biopsychosocial model. American Journal of Psychiatry,
137(5), 535–544.
Feigl, H. (1967). The mental and the physical. The essay and a postscript. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Flor, H., Knost, B., & Birbaumer, N. (2002). The role of operant conditioning in chronic pain: An experi-
mental investigation. Pain, 95, 111–118.
Fodor, J. (1974). Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese, 28,
97–115.
Franklin, A. (1986). The neglect of experiment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frith, C. D. (1992). The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Germain, P.-L., & Baetu, T. M. (2017). Extrapolation in biomedical research: A multi-model perspective.
In Marco Nathan & Giovanni Boniolo (Eds.), Foundational issues in molecular medicine. New York:
Routledge.
Glennan, S. (1996). Mechanisms and the nature of causation. Erkenntnis, 44, 49–71.
Glennan, S. (2002). Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science, 69, S342–S353.
Gori, G. B. (1989). Epidemiology and the concept of causation in multifactorial diseases. Regulatory
Toxicology and Pharmacology, 9(3), 263–272.
Gossel, P. P. (1992). Need for standard methods: The case of american bacteriology. In A. Clarke & J.
Fujimura (Eds.), The Right tools for the job: At work in twentieth century life sciences. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Guyatt, G., Rennie, D., Meade, M. O., & Cook, D. J. (2015). Users guides to the medical literature:
Essentials of evidence-based clinical practice (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, A. B. (1965). The environment and disease: Association or causation? Proceedings of the royal society
of medicine, 58, 295–300.
Howick, J. (2011). The Philosophy of evidence-based medicine. Oxford: BMJ Books.
Illari, P., & Williamson, J. (2011). Mechanisms are real and local. In P. McKay Illari, F. Russo, & J.
Williamson (Eds.), Causality in the sciences (pp. 818–844). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kendall, R. E. (2001). The distinction between mental and physical illness. The British Journal of Psychiatry,
178(6), 490–493.
Kendler, K. S., & Campbell, J. (2009). Interventionist causal models in psychiatry: Repositioning the mind-
body problem. Psychological Medicine, 39, 881–887.
Kim, J. (Ed.). (1993). Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion. In Supervenience and mind. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism or something near enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Krieger, N. (1994). Epidemiology and the web of causation: Has anyone seen the spider? Social Science
and Medicine, 39(7), 887–903.
Leonelli, S. (2009). On the locality of data and claims about phenomena. Philosophy of Science, 76, 737–
749.
123
Synthese
Leonelli, S. (2007). What is in a model? In M. Laubichler & G. Muller (Eds.), Modeling biology: Structures,
behaviours, evolution (pp. 15–36). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354–
361.
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67,
1–25.
McAllister, J. W. (1997). Phenomena and patterns in data sets. Erkenntnis, 47, 217–228.
Melzack, R., & Wall, P. D. (1965). Pain mechanisms: A new theory. Science, 150, 971–979.
Morange, M. (2009). Synthetic biology: A bridge between functional and evolutionary biology. Biological
Theory, 4(4), 368–377.
Müller-Wille, S. (2007). Hybrids, pure cultures, and pure lines: From nineteenth-century biology to
twentieth-century genetics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences,
38(4), 796–806.
Murphy, D. (2006). Psychiatry in the scientific image. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
OpenScienceCollaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science,
349(6251), 943–951.
Putnam, H. (Ed.). (1975). Philosophy and our mental life. In Mind, language, and reality, (pp. 291–303).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rainville, P., Duncan, G. H., Price, D. D., Carrier, B., & Bushnell, M. C. (1997). Pain affect encoded in
human anterior cingulate but not somatosensory cortex. Science, 277(5328), 968–971.
Rosenthal, D. M. (1994). Identity theories. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A companion to the philosophy of mind
(pp. 348–355). Oxford: Blackwell.
Rossy, L. A., Buckelew, S. P., Dorr, N., Hagglund, K. J., Thayer, J. F., McIntosh, M. J., et al. (1999). A
meta-analysis of fibromyalgia treatment interventions. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 21(2), 180–
191.
Schaffner, K. F. (1993). Discovery and explanation in biology and medicine. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, 68, 141–156.
Smyth, J. M., Ockenfels, M. C., Gorin, A. A., Catley, D., Porter, L. S., Kirschbaum, C., et al. (1997).
Individual differences in the diurnal cycle of cortisol. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 22(2), 89–105.
Steel, D. (2007). Across the boundaries: Extrapolation in biology and social science. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Turk, D. C. (2002). A diathesis-stress model of chronic pain and disability following traumatic injury. Pain
Research and Management, 7, 9–19.
Waddell, G. (1987). A new clinical model for the treatment of low back pain. Spine, 12, 632–644.
Weber, M. (2005). Philosophy of experimental biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weber, M. (2008). Experimentation. In S. Sarkar & A. Plutynski (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of
biology. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Wimsatt, W. C. (1972). Complexity and organization. In K. F. Schaffner & R. S. Cohen (Eds.), PSA 1972,
Proceedings of the philosophy of science association (pp. 67–86). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Wimsatt, W. C. (1981). Robustness, reliability, and overdetermination. In M. B. Brewer & B. E. Collins
(Eds.), Scientific inquiry and the social sciences (pp. 124–163). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Woodward, J. (2002). What is a mechanism? A counterfactual account. Philosophy of Science, 69, S366–
S377.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Woodward, J. (2008). Cause and explanation in psychiatry: An interventionist perspective. In K. Kendler
& J. Parnas (Eds.), Philosophical issues in psychiatry: Explanation, phenomenology and nosology.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
123
